

## Where Dirt and Policy Meet: The Economics of Soil Carbon

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## **Objectives**

Introduce the Notion of Carbon Markets
Identify Key Economic Issues
Briefly Discuss Tools
Present Preliminary Results
Hear from You About Contracts for Soil Carbon Sequestration



## Why A Carbon Market?

- Emissions Reductions

   Reduce CO2 and other GHG

   Efficient Allocation of Emissions

   Distribute the emissions efficiently across regions, countries, sectors, industries within sectors, and firms within industries
- Kyoto Protocol

- Took effect on February 16, 2005



## What Is Traded?


- Allowance-Based Transactions
  - Trading of government-issued allowances to emit GHG
- Project-Based Transactions
  - Trading emissions credits generated by projects that reduce GHG emissions



## **Carbon Market Volume**


State and Trends of Carbon Market 2005

FIGURE 1: ANNUAL VOLUMES (million tCO<sub>2</sub>e) OF PROJECT-BASED EMISSION REDUCTIONS TRADED (up to 2012 vintages)






# Who's Buying?



Jan. 2004 – April 2005



## Who Is Selling?




Jan. 2004 – April 2005



# How Big Is the Market?


FIGURE 6: TOTAL MARKET VALUE (ESTIMATE) PER YEAR in million U.S. dollars (nominal)





## **Prices Paid for Carbon**

FIGURE 5: PRICES FOR NON-RETAIL PROJECT-BASED ERs January 2004 to April 2005 (in U.S.\$ per tCO<sub>2</sub>e)



ER = Emission Reductions (projects); VER = Verified Emissions Reductions; CER = Certified Emissions Reductions; ERU = Emission Reduction Units



### Key Economic Issues

Private Costs and Benefits - Level of profitability **Cash flow** Changes in production costs Change in farmers' time requirements Social Costs and Benefits - Types of costs; timing -Types of benefits; timing; beneficiaries



# **One Tool -- LUS Analysis**


- Focus on Land Use Systems (LUS)
  - Multi-year duration
  - Different intermediate and end uses
- Estimate Economic Effects
  - Discounted streams of input <u>costs</u> and product <u>revenues</u>
  - Calculate economic <u>returns</u> to key factors of production
    - Land, labor
- Estimate the Environmental Effects
- Estimate the Sociocultural Effects
- Highlight Institutional Impediments to LUS
   Adoption



### The Field 74 Carbon Sequestration Project

 Focus: Identify the impacts in a maizewheat system of reduced till vs.
 standard till on CO2 and N2O flux, croped yield, water quality and balance, and system profitability

## CO2 and N2O flux






# **Yield and Profitability**

#### Results to date - Yields declined sharply in year one RT yield → 3.64 tons/acre ST yield -> 5.32 tons/acre Manter Reprintation **Despite reduced operational costs in RT** system profits fell sharply • RT NPV/acre (7 years) -> \$1022 • ST NPV/acre (7 years) → \$1597



### Costs of Additional Soil Carbon in Field 74





### C Sequestration in LTRAS Organic vs. Conventional Maize-Tomato Systems

LUS	Even Years	Odd Years
Conventional maize- tomato (CMT)	fertilized irrigated corn	fertilized irrigated tomato
Organic maize-tomato (OMT)	winter legume / irrigated corn compost / no pesticides	winter legume / irrigated tomato compost / no pesticides

• <u>Focus</u>: Identify the effects of organic (vs. conventional) management of a maizetomato rotation over 9 years on soil organic carbon, crop yields and system profitability



#### Crop Yields (tons/acre)

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Avg
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


# Profitability

System	Net Present Value (\$)	Returns to Land (/\$/ac/year)	Profitability as % of Conventional System
Conventional	8278	307	
Organic, No Premium	1981	73	24%
Organic, Declining Premium	4315	160	52%
Organic, Premium	5607	623	203%




#### Soil Carbon Accumulation (over 9 years)





### **Profitability & Increased Soil C**





### Case Study Conclusions (Preliminary)

- Stocks of Soil Carbon Can Be Increased in California, but the Amounts Will Depend on:
  - climatic conditions
  - management strategy
  - product mix
  - soil type
- Changes in Product Mix and Crop Management Strategies Can Increase Soil Carbon
  - Such Changes Can Be Costly to Farmers, and Yields and Profits May Decline
- Soil Carbon-Profitability Trade-Offs – Field 74 Study Exhibited Trade-Offs
- Soil Carbon-Profitability Synergies
  - LTRAS Tomato/Maize Study Exhibited Synergies
    - These depended greatly on price the premiums



# **Policy Implications**

- Paying Farmers to Sequester Carbon Could Be Expensive
- Payment schemes would have to address local heterogeneity in soil and climate conditions
- Soil Carbon Pools Have Maxima and Sequestered Carbon Can Be Quickly Lost

   Payment schemes need to take account of this
- Not All Increases in Soil Carbon Are 'Sequestered'
  - Out-of-system inputs can matter greatly
  - Perhaps these 'imports' should also be paid for under incentive schemes

# **Implications for Research**

- We Need to Know Much More About Carbon
   Dynamics in California Soils
  - Product mixes
  - Soil management practices
  - Soil types
  - Limits to and stability of carbon pools
- We Need to Know More About the Effects of Different Tillage and Residue Management Strategies on:
  - Yields
  - Production costs
  - Risk
  - Profits



## Contracts for Soil Carbon Sequestration

- Standard Contracts
- Modifying Contracts to Meet the Needs of California Farmers
  - Duration
  - Up-Front costs
  - Escrow accounts
  - Monitoring
  - Within-contract changes in
    - Product mix
    - Production technology



### • THANKS!

## • WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS?